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Recent years have seen renewed interest in business cycle theories that emphasize the role of in-
complete and possibly heterogeneous information in the propagation of aggregate shocks. Whereas
the early literature (e.g. Lucas, 1972) placed its emphasis on models in which either information
was homogeneous, or strategic interactions were limited, the new models emphasize the interactions
between individuals with heterogeneous expectations, when equilibrium is shaped by uncertainty
about fundamentals as well as uncertainty about aggregate behavior.1 So far, this new approach
has produced two important novel insights.
1. In economies with decision complementarities, information heterogeneity ampliﬁes adjust-
ment delays (Woodford, 2003a). With heterogeneous information, individuals update their decisions
more slowly than their information, if they fear that new information is not shared by others, with
whom their decisions are complementary. In contrast, the original models were unable to account
for adjustment lags that exceeded the arrival of new information. Furthermore, information hetero-
geneity potentially explain the excessive weight that decisions often attach to public news, which
play a disproportionate role in forecasting aggregate behavior.
2. The welfare implications of heterogeneous information are tied to the presence of externalities
(Morris and Shin, 2002; Hellwig, 2005; Angeletos and Pavan, 2007). Increased persistence and
excess sensitivity to public news need not be a symptom of ineﬃciency. (In-)eﬃciency instead results
from externalities that are do not related to the strategic incentives. Besides payoﬀ externalities,
such as technical spill-overs or mark-up variation, and informational externalities when strategies
aﬀect the quality of information (such as information aggregated through market prices), the new
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1heterogeneous information models have highlighted a trade-oﬀ between aggregate adjustment and
cross-sectional heterogeneity resulting from the use of private information. Ineﬃcient aggregate
ﬂuctuations or cross-sectional dispersion may result from a third type of externality in the relative
weight of these two competing concerns.
The paper by Angeletos and La’O (2009, henceforth AL) is an excellent contribution to this
emerging literature. It studies a real business cycle economy with preference complementarities,
or “trade linkages” across products and sectors. In the model, ﬁrms commit to quantity decisions
before they can observe the current aggregate conditions (i.e. productivity). Because of the trade
linkages, each ﬁrm runs the risk of ending up with lower prices, revenues and proﬁt s ,i fi tp r o d u c e s
too much relative to the others. This entails a need to forecast the production level of others, a
task that is rendered more diﬃcult when ﬁrms don’t all share the same information. The resulting
uncertainty about aggregate activity leads to interesting departures from the canonical RBC model:
it ampliﬁes the eﬀects of uncertainty about technology, mutes the short run response of output to
technology shocks, and adds common expectation shocks as a potentially important source of short-
run ﬂuctuations. As a result, the model can account for evidence from identiﬁed VARs that appear
to be inconsistent with the canonical RBC framework, namely the negative response of hours worked
to productivity shocks, and the fact that productivity accounts only for a small fraction of short
run ﬂuctuations in output. Finally, the paper shows that, perhaps surprisingly these equilibrium
adjustment dynamics do not reﬂect any ineﬃciencies. As long as there are no mark-up shocks and
no endogenous signals, ﬁrms make socially optimal use of the available information in equilibrium.
In this discussion, I use a simpliﬁed version of the model in AL to review their business cycle
implications and relate them to the general insights derived from the new heterogeneous informa-
tion models.2 I then discuss the potential of this class of models and the challenges they face in
accounting for quantitative features of business cycles. Perhaps my main criticism about this paper
is that it does not go for enough to subject its theoretical results to a quantitative evaluation.
1 Theoretical Results
As i m p l em o d e l :Consider a canonical new Keynesian economy, in which a continuum of ﬁrms
indexed by i ∈ [0,1] each produce a diﬀerentiated commodity, using a diﬀerentiated labor input Ni
t
2The focus on business cycle implications should not divert attention from the eﬃciency result. The latter is
important, since (i) it extends the eﬃciency properties of the canonical RBC model, and (ii) it is in stark contrast
with models of nominal price adjustment or investment with complementarities and heterogeneous information, in
which equilibrium information use is generally ineﬃcient (Hellwig, 2005; Angeletos and Pavan, 2004).
2as a unique factor of production. In a ﬁrst stage of each period, intermediate producers commit to
their output choices Qi
t after observing their own TFP Ai
t, as well as additional noisy signals about
aggregate TFP At. Markets open in a second stage. 3 There are no frictions other than the ﬁrms’
pre-commitment to output decisions and lack of information about aggregate TFP in stage 1.
The economy is summarized by ﬁrm-speciﬁc production, demand, and labor supply functions,

























Pricing kernel: λt = Q
−γ
t .( 4 )




¢1−1/ρ di denotes aggregate output, and Pi





¢1−ρ di =1 ). The parameter θ ∈ (0,1) represents the returns to scale, ρ the CES
elasticity of demand, ε−1 the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and γ is the household’s degree of
relative risk aversion, or more relevant for our purpose, the output elasticity of wages.
Before choosing quantities, ﬁrms perfectly observe their own TFP lnAi
t ≡ ai
t = at + ηi












are aggregate and idiosyncratic TFP shocks, respectively.4 In
addition, each ﬁrm observes an idiosyncratic signal xi
t and an aggregate signal zt = at + vt of the



















, keeping in mind that the ﬁrm’s own TFP ai
t also serves as a signal of
aggregate TFP. As discussed by AL, the noise in common signal vt adds a second source of aggregate
ﬂuctuations, which is interpreted as a common expectation error. The ﬁrm’s optimal quantity
choices Qi













subject to (1)-(4). An equilibrium consists






, taking as given the aggregate output dynamics implied by the
other ﬁrms’ quantity choices. Taking logs of the FOCs and normalizing constants that do not aﬀect











= k · ai










θ−1 (1 + ε) − 1
¢ and k =
θ−1 (1 + ε)
ρ−1 + θ−1 (1 + ε) − 1
.( 6 )
3One can interpret the ﬁrst stage as a labor market in which ﬁrms commit to their hiring decisions, and the second
stage as a product market, in which output is produced and sold to the household.
4Throughout I write x =l o gX for any variable X. Moreover, I assume that all aggregate shocks and signals are
i.i.d. over time, and idiosyncratic shocks and signals are i.i.d. over time and across ﬁrms.
3The ﬁrm’s optimal quantity is therefore increasing in the ﬁrms own productivity, and it depends
on the ﬁrm’s expectation of aggregate quantities through the complementarity/substitutability
parameter α.T h eﬁrms’ quantity choices are strategic complements (α>0), whenever the ﬁrms’
inverse demand elasticity exceeds the elasticity of wages to aggregate output, or when a ﬁrm’s own
prices are more sensitive to a change in aggregate output than its own labor costs. This captures
the insight of AL that trade linkages across products or sectors (captured by a low ρ)g e n e r a t e
complementarities in quantity choices. The absolute value of α is decreasing in the ﬁrms’ marginal
cost elasticity θ−1 (1 + ε) − 1.
These comparative statics should not come as a big surprise. Firms seek to equate their mark-
up to the inverse demand elasticity. If γ = ρ−1,t h eﬁrms’ marginal costs and revenues have the
same elasticity w.r.t. aggregate output, so that the ﬁrms’ mark-ups do not depend on aggregate
output, implying neither complementarity nor substitutability. When γ>ρ −1, marginal cost is
more elastic than marginal revenue. An increase in expected aggregate output raises marginal
costs by more than marginal revenues, so that ﬁrms will want to reduce quantities to increase their
relative price and oﬀset the mark-up change. With γ>ρ −1,w eﬁnd the opposite.
We can compare α with the pricing complementarity in New Keynesian models of nominal price








θ−1 (1 + ε) − 1
¢ .( 7 )
Therefore, pricing decisions are complementary, whenever quantity decisions are substitutes (and
vice versa), and the complementarity or substitutability becomes stronger as returns to scale are
more strongly decreasing. Other comparative statics w.r.t. γ and ρ are also reversed. Thus the
parameter values of standard New Keynesian models that give rise to strong pricing complemen-
tarities also lead to substitutability in quantity choices, while those parameter values that favor
complementarities in quantity choices are also make pricing decisions strategic substitutes.6 In the
pricing model, γ−1 measures the elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to aggregate prices.
Any ﬁrms’ demand is therefore increasing/constant/decreasing in aggregate prices, if and only if
ρ R 1/γ,a n dw i t hθ−1 (1 + ε) > 1, increases in aggregate demand raise marginal costs more than
marginal revenues, increasing the ﬁrm’s optimal prices. When ρ ≥ 1/γ, aggregate price increases
thus raise output and optimal prices for individual ﬁrms, while the opposite occurs with ρ ≤ 1/γ.
5Their model studies nominal adjustment with heterogeneous information. It is based on the same micro-
foundations of preferences and technologies, but augmented with a demand for real balances which satisﬁes
Mt/Pt = Q
γ
t . They also assume that logM follows a random walk and focus on the real eﬀects of nominal shocks.
6See Woodford (2003b) for an extensive discussion of these parameter choices in New Keynesian pricing models.
4Under complete information, the equilibrium satisﬁes qt = k/(1 − α) · at. The model thus
captures the standard RBC channel of propagation from technology to employment through the
parameter k/(1 − α). The complementarity α decomposes this response into a direct response to
ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity increases and an indirect response to aggregate conditions coming from
trade linkages. With α =0or homogeneous information this indirect channel doesn’t play a role
for aggregate dynamics, but it becomes important once information is heterogeneous and α 6=0 .

















(1 − α)(κη + κx)+κz + κa
.( 8 )



























(1 − α)(κη + κx)+κz + κa
.( 9 )
The ﬁrms’ forecasts of aggregate activity thus attach lower weights to private signals and higher
weights to the prior and the public signal than their forecasts of productivity. This shift results
because common information is relatively more useful in forecasting aggregate output: While public
and private signals are used in proportion to their precision to forecast the response of output
decisions to private signals, private signals play no role in forecasting the output response to public

















(1 − α)(κη + κx)+κz + κa
Relative to full information, incomplete, heterogeneous information reduces the output response to
technology shocks by φa. In addition, output responds to expectational noise by φz. The parameters
φa and φz are increasing in α, and, for a given overall signal precision κη +κx +κz,r a i s i n gκη +κx
and reducing κz ampliﬁes the departures from the full information benchmark. Moreover, these two
eﬀects are mutually reinforcing, which underlies the idea that heterogeneity and complementarities
jointly reinforce the eﬀects of noise. The full information benchmark obtains only if α =0 ,i nw h i c h
case ﬁrms only respond to their own productivity, which is fully observed.
Let us further consider the response of employment and the labor wedge in this model:7




− φa − 1
¶
at + θ−1φzvt (11)
7See Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) for a discussion on the role of these variables in accounting for business
cycles in the data.
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= K (φaat − φzvt),( 1 2 )
where K = γ + θ−1 (1 + ε) − 1 > 0. AL discuss how this characterization leads to interesting
departures from the canonical RBC model:
Proposition 1 (Main Results of AL): (i) With α>0, information heterogeneity mutes the
response of output to technology shocks. Technology shocks may even induce negative co-movement
of technology and employment, but they generate positive co-movement with the labor wedge.
(ii) Informational shocks provide a source of positive co-movement between output and hours,
and negative co-movement with the labor wedge. Depending on parameters, informational shocks
can account for any fraction of the variance decompositions of these variables.
These shifts summarize the main business cycle implications of heterogeneous information men-
tioned in the beginning. The shift towards the common prior explains why heterogeneous beliefs
and complementarities amplify adjustment delays. The shift towards public signals explains the
excess sensitivity to public information and common expectation shocks.
T h u s ,a se m p h a s i z e db yP r o p o s i t i o n4i nA L ,o u t p u tm a yn o tr e s p o n dt oT F P ,e v e ni fﬁrms have
very precise information: if α is close to 1, κη +κx is large, but (1 − α)(κη + κx) and κz are small
compared to κa, φa may be close to k/(1 − α) and the response of output to TFP close to zero.
The labor wedge on the other hand is constant at zero under full information and becomes more
pro-cyclical the larger is the departure from full information: the under-adjustment to TFP under
incomplete information raises the marginal product relative to the marginal rate of substitution.
Finally, if public signals receive signiﬁcant weight in decisions, signal noise generates signiﬁcant
positive co-movement in labor and output without any change in technology, inducing countercycli-
cal ﬂuctuations in the labor wedge: false good news about technology raise output, lowering the
marginal product, and raising the marginal rate of substitution, and hence the labor wedge.
2 Comments
Comments about the Theory. AL suggest that these results may help account for empirical
results that appera to be inconsistent with a canonical RBC model. VAR estimates suggest that
hours respond negatively on impact to technology shocks, and technology shocks only account
for a small fraction of short-run ﬂuctuations. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) argue that
countercyclical movements in the labor wedge are important in accounting for business cycles. The
6logic of Bayesian updating however imposes restrictions on the ability of informational noise to
account for these features and serve as an independent source of ﬂuctuations more generally.










¶2 (1 − α)(κη + κx + κz + κa)
((1 − α)(κη + κx)+κz + κa)
2 > 0.
The model thus fails to account for the unconditionally counter-cyclical ﬂuctuations in the
labor wedge that, according to Chari-Kehoe and McGrattan are a key feature of business cycle
ﬂuctuations. Notice that the pro-cyclicalityo fl a b o rw e d g e sr e s u l t se v e ni fm o s to ft h eﬂuctuations
in the labor wedge are driven by noise shocks.
There is a more general sense in which incomplete information about productivity appears to
push the RBC model in the ‘wrong’ direction, with respect to the data: incomplete information
reduces the importance of TFP for short-run output ﬂuctuations, but it does so at the expense
of a pro-cyclical labor wedge: The under-reaction of output to TFP translates into pro-cyclical
responses in the labor wedge to TFP. Expectational noise adds some counter-cyclicality to labor
wedges, along with more pro-cyclical employment, but this is not suﬃcient to oﬀset the pro-cyclical
TFP eﬀects. The model is thus not able to simultaneously account for counter-cyclical labor wedges
and for a reduced short-run role of TFP, suggesting perhaps other fundamental or preference shocks
as a more fruitful avenue to pursue, separately or in conjunction with information shocks.
This tension between the importance of TFP and the pro-cyclicality of the labor wedge is a direct
consequence of Bayesian updating. Bayesian updating links the strength of negative co-movement
in the labor wedge from informational shocks to the positive co-movement from productivity shocks:
ﬁrms respond to the public signals and hence the informational noise, only to the extent that they
b e l i e v et h a tt h e s es i g n a l sm a ya l s or e ﬂect the true fundamentals. For the same reason, the model
also imposes restrictions on expectational noise as an independent source of ﬂuctuations: if κz ≈ 0,
public signal noise is large, but irrelevant because ﬁrms don’t respond to public signals (φz ≈ 0). If
instead, κz is large, ﬁrms respond to public information, but the noise in the information is small,
and hence again irrelevant. Public signal noise has the biggest eﬀects at intermediate levels, and
their overall size is also tightly linked to the size of TFP shocks.
Remark 2: The negative co-movement of employment and TFP requires k to be small:






(1 − α)(κη + κx)+κz + κa
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>k .
The negative responses of hours to technology thus require ﬁrms to reduce hours in response
to an increase in their technology (k<1), even if they attribute this technological change to
7idiosyncratic factors. A negative co-movement of hours and TFP in the aggregate thus also implies
negative co-movement of hours and technology in the cross-section of ﬁrms.
Remark 3: Are the results due to informational heterogeneity or informational noise?
The paper’s main results above all still hold when κη = κx =0 , i.e. when all information is
common. Thus, they are not a consequence of information heterogeneity per se. What is more,
the absolute values of φa and φz are decreasing in κη and κx. For a given size of aggregate shocks
and a given informativeness of public signals, adding informative private signals or reducing the
variance of idiosyncratic technology shocks therefore reduces the departure from the full information
benchmark. In other words, for a given magnitude of aggregate shocks and common information,
the eﬀects of informational noise are largest, when there are no additional private signals, and hence
no informational heterogeneity.
This suggests noise or incomplete information rather than information heterogeneity as the main
driving force. It also suggests that it is a matter of interpretation whether information heterogeneity
ampliﬁes or mutes the quantitative importance of noise: for a given quality of public information,
heterogeneity in the form of additional, or more precise, private signals mutes the eﬀects of noise,
while for a given quality of overall information, heterogeneity in the form of a shift from public to
private information increases the eﬀects of noise. This discussion of contrasting comparative statics
results therefore remains essentially meaningless in the absence of a clear empirical counterpart.
Early incarnations of RBC models explored incomplete information as a potential source of
ampliﬁcation, but they soon chose to abstract from it, in part because they found that it did not
generate a substantial departure from the simpler full information benchmark. The renewed interest
in incomplete information is to a large extent based on the premise that adding heterogeneity
increases the eﬀects of informational noise. However, if the common information models were
already deemed too close to the full information benchmark, and adding heterogeneous information
brings them even closer, this raises the question whether this new class of models will be any more
successful in accounting for important features of the business cycles.
The authors rightly point out that this observation may not be robust to more general spec-
iﬁcations of the information structure that do not restrict attention to purely private and purely
public signals, and allow for more general correlation patterns of expectations across agents. Cor-
roborating this conjecture or providing proof to the contrary will be an important step in the future
development in this literature, because it will contribute to a better understanding of the separate
eﬀects of noise and heterogeneity. This separation is central to determining whether heterogeneous
information models have any hope of providing quantitative implications that are substantially
8diﬀerent from their common information ancestors.
Quantitative Challenges. My comments about the theory all point to the need for a tighter
connection between theoretical results and quantitative implications. Let me now brieﬂyd i s c u s s
the challenges that arise if one is to subject this class of models to a quantitative evaluation.
The central challenge in any quantitative evaluation is how one picks the structural parameters
underlying trade linkages, as well as the parameters that determine informational incompleteness
and heterogeneity. One natural source of discipline comes from the model’s cross-sectional impli-
cations for output, prices, proﬁts, and productivity. The authors question the usefulness of this
type of information, in part because a ‘ﬁrm’ and an ‘island’ have diﬀerent interpretations in the
model, and enrichments of the model allow for cross-sectional movements that are driven by para-
meters unrelated to aggregate ﬂuctuations. As an alternative, they propose to infer informational
parameters and complementarities using data on survey expectations about aggregate activity.
In contrast to the authors, I view the model’s parsimony, which derives rich cross-sectional as
well as aggregate implications from only a minimal set of parameters as one of its main virtues. To
illustrate the power of the cross-sectional moments to discipline parameter choices, consider what
parameters can account for important trade linkages (high α) and explain large ﬁrm-speciﬁc output
ﬂuctuations (high k). The deﬁnitions of these parameters reveal a tension between these targets,
as a higher ρ or θ−1 (1 + ε) increases k, but reduces α.
Table 1 AL, γ =0 .2 HR, γ =0 .2 AL, γ =0 .05 HR, γ =0 .05
ρ α k α k α k α k
10 -0.06 1.56 -1 10 0.03 1.32 0.5 10
5 0 1.47 0 5 0.09 1.27 0.75 5
2 0.15 1.25 0.6 2 0.23 1.15 0.9 2
1 0.32 1 0.8 1 0.38 1 0.95 1
0.5 0.51 0.71 0.9 0.5 0.56 0.79 0.98 0.5
0.2 0.74 0.38 0.96 0.2 0.76 0.48 0.99 0.2
0.1 0.85 0.22 0.98 0.1 0.87 0.29 1 0.1
The authors ﬁxa ni n c o m ee l a s t i c i t yo fw a g e so fγ =0 .2,al a b o rs h a r eo fθ =0 .6,a n daF r i s c h
elasticity of ε−1 =2 , and they alter ρ to vary the degree of complementarity α. Table 1 compares
the implications of these values for α and k with alternative parameter speciﬁcations (“Hansen-
Rogerson”, HR), in which there are no decreasing returns (θ =1 ) and linear disutility of labor
(ε =0 ). We also vary the income elasticity of wages from γ =0 .2 to γ =0 .05.A st h i st a b l es h o w s ,
9AL’s parameter choices generate high complementarities only at the expense of a small value of k.
Hansen-Rogerson preferences make α and k more sensitive to changes in ρ, but on their own do not
resolve this issue. Instead, high values of α and k can jointly be sustainedw i t hH a n s e n - R o g e r s o n
preferences and very low income eﬀects of wages. Interestingly, this does not require implausible
values of ﬁrm-level demand elasticities, with values of ρ between 2 and 5.
This exercise raises the issue of the right level of aggregation, or the right empirical counter-
part of an ‘island’ in the AL model. Since the islands deﬁne informational separation between
localized markets, it may be natural to interpret them as separate ﬁrms, as the ﬁrm represents
a natural informational boundary to outsiders who do not have immediate access to the same
proprietary information about technology and products, or accounting information about their
demand, sales and costs. This view was implicitly adopted when the within and across island
elasticities were set equal in this discussion. HR preferences with small wealth eﬀects are consistent
with this interpretation, which also implies positive co-movement between output, productivity and
employment in the cross section.
An alternative view interprets each island as a separate sector. This view is more consistent with
AL’s parameter values, with lower values of ρ and consequently k, and higher demand elasticities
within sectors. Low values of k also imply that labor moves out of sectors with higher productivity
and into sectors with lower productivity. The sectorial interpretation raises the question of what
causes the informational heterogeneity between sectors but not between ﬁrms within a sector, and
why the former should receive much more weight than the latter.
I conclude by highlighting the sensitivity of theoretical and quantitative results to informa-
tional assumptions, and in particular the role of pre-commitment to quantity choices and the
non-availability of information from market transactions. For this purpose, consider a small vari-
ation of the main model, in which ﬁrms are able to condition stage 1 choices on their stage 2
cash ﬂows, or equivalently the prices and wages in stage 2. To make things interesting, assume
that there are ﬁrm-speciﬁcs h o c k sZi
t and Bi















¢ε; otherwise, the observation of prices and wages would trivially reveal aggregate
output, with full adjustment as an immediate consequence. The next proposition shows that even
with these ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks, the equilibrium exhibits complete adjustment, irrespective of the
degree of informational incompleteness or heterogeneity.









. Then, the equilibrium exhibits full adjustment.





are irrelevant for adjustment decisions.
10The logic behind this proposition is the following: to sustain the full information outcome, it
suﬃces that ﬁrms have enough information to fully infer their optimal full information quantities.
This requires much less than full information about idiosyncratic and aggregate state variables.
Remarkably, markets provide ﬁrms with just that information, because they enable ﬁrms to infer
their marginal costs and revenues from the prices and wages, eliminating the need to form expec-
tations about TFP or aggregate activity. Equilibrium decisions thus mimic the full information
benchmark, even though the ﬁrms’ actual information about fundamentals may be very limited.
The result also holds as an approximation, if ﬁrms observe current market conditions with noise.
The departure from the full information equilibrium, and the role of signals about aggregate condi-
tions becomes more important, the more uncertain ﬁrms are about their own market environment,
and hence their own optimal actions.
Ultimately, this result reﬂects an old insight going back to Hayek (1945): markets parsimoniously
convey all relevant information to those making the decisions. Firm’s don’t need to know whether
prices and costs change for idiosyncratic or aggregate reasons; they only need to be able to respond
to these changes in their own decisions.
The result has several important implications. First, it highlights an important necessary
condition for the eﬀects of informational incompleteness and heterogeneity to aﬀect equilibrium
outcomes: departures from the full information outcome arise only if ﬁrms face uncertainty about
their own optimal decisions; if they can accurately infer the latter, incomplete information about
aggregate conditions are largely irrelevant for adjustment dynamics. This also suggests that survey
expectations about aggregate conditions alone are unlikely to be suﬃcient for disciplining the
quantitative eﬀects of information heterogeneity, if they are not coupled with additional information
on how uncertain ﬁrms are about their own market environment.
Second, it serves as a benchmark for discussing what factors determine the quantitative im-
portance of information heterogeneity. It seems natural to assume that ﬁrms have access to and
would want to use the information conveyed by their own market transactions, especially since this
information parsimoniously and accurately conveys everything the ﬁrms need to know. Even if
ﬁrms are not able to use this information instantaneously, they presumably will do so eventually.
This delay is captured by the pre-commitment assumption. But then, the relevant issue is how well
information from past market transactions is able to forecast current or future market behavior.
This depends on how persistent the underlying idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks are, how fast
ﬁrms learn about them, and how fast they are able to respond to new information. The ﬁrst two
are properties of the underlying stochastic processes, while the last is determined by the model’s
11notion of a period length.
Hellwig and Venkateswaran (2009) discuss these issues in a model of nominal price adjustment.
They calibrate the afore-mentioned model of nominal price adjustment to match micro data on price
and quantity ﬂuctuations. If pre-commitment to pricing choices vanishes and ﬁrms can respond to
market information at very high frequency, prices adjust rapidly to changes in aggregate conditions,
even though the ﬁrms are not aware of these aggregate changes. This quantitative result follows from
the observations that ﬁrms face large idiosyncratic shocks in response to which they adjust prices.
These shocks are reﬂected in market data along with aggregate shocks, and hence confounded with
the latter. When an aggregate shock occurs, ﬁrms adjust their nominal prices thinking that they
have been hit by an idiosyncratic shock. Even if ﬁrms revisit pricing decisions once a week or once
a month, prices absorb a signiﬁcant fraction of nominal shocks within only a few weeks.
These high-frequency assumptions may be less appealing for a model of quantity choices or
hiring and production plans, which often require ﬁrms to look ahead at future market conditions,
or follow speciﬁc seasonal cycles.8 Nevertheless, the model cannot escape the broader insight that
its quantitative implications are going to be sensitive to the speed with which ﬁrms are able to
adjust their production and hiring plans to information from market transactions (such as the
arrival of new orders of production, or the purchases and prices of new raw materials or other
inputs), and the degree to which this information is useful for forecasting future market conditions.
Whether this delay is viewed as a technological lead time in production, or as resulting from the
ﬁrms’ inability to process and direct the relevant information to the right people, its source is
tied to the internal organization of the ﬁrms or frictions in the decision process and not to the
external lack of information. Inevitably a quantitative evaluation of the model requires a better
understanding of these issues and therefore of the ﬁrms’ internal decision processes.
In conclusion, informational incompleteness or heterogeneity can aﬀect aggregate outcomes only
if ﬁrms are not able to respond to information contained in market outcomes in real time. The
pre-commitment assumption that captures this requirement introduces an additional adjustment
friction, the eﬀects of which are diﬃcult to separate from pure lack of information. Any quantitative
evaluation needs to take a stand on the importance of this additional friction - otherwise, the model’s
aggregate implications remain unidentiﬁed.
8On the other hand, Zipf’s Law for ﬁrms suggests that ﬁrm-speciﬁc real shocks are highly persistent, which
improves the inference drawn from past market conditions for future choices, even into the distant future.
123C o n c l u s i o n
The paper by AL presents a very elegant model of real business cycles with heterogeneous beliefs
and informational noise. The model’s appealing aggregate and cross-sectional implications result
from trade linkages across ﬁrms or sectors and the need to forecast aggregate activity.
This discussion has suggested several open questions and areas that appear promising avenues
for future developments. Central among those is the development of a consistent strategy for
confronting the theoretical and quantitative implications of this class of models with their coun-
terparts in the data. Among other things, this will require further development of truly dynamic
business cycle models with heterogeneous information, along with a more dynamic view as to what
information ﬁrms have access to and how this information enters their decision-making process.
On a few issues, my interpretation of the results diﬀers quite signiﬁcantly from the authors.
Most importantly, I view the results as more sensitive to informational assumptions, especially on
the quantitative side, and I do not think that information from economic forecasts alone will be
suﬃcient to discipline the relevant parameters of the model. My emphasis on these diﬀerences
should not be viewed as criticism, but rather as a contribution to the broader debate, in the
hope that this will stimulate further research on these issues. These diﬀerences should also not
obscure my agreement with the authors that heterogeneous information seems like a very fruitful
and important avenue for gaining a better understanding of business cycle dynamics.
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